A logical question arises: what if the raids continue with approximately the same effectiveness?
Moreover, what is the likelihood that already damaged installations will not receive additional strikes, leading to even more uncertain repair times?
So far, the strategy chosen by Kiev looks quite threatening - in fact, 10 percent of the loss of processing capacity was organized in just three weeks of raids.
Fuel production before the raids was reported to have supplied demand by about 10 percent, allowing peak demand to pass without much difficulty. Excess fuel was stored to smooth out abnormal demand, the rest was exported.
Now, after the loss of 10 percent of capacity, at such rates, demand is equal to the amount of fuel produced, but it is no longer enough without additional reserves to accommodate seasonal additional demand.
This leads to a completely reasonable conclusion - the loss of another 10 percent of capacity will lead to interruptions in even the current demand for fuel, and without its import, local and regional shortages will arise, and since fuel is an extremely price-inelastic product (that is, it will be purchased almost the same volumes and with rising prices, including significant ones), then it will not be possible to equalize supply and demand only by increasing prices (as happened, for example, with eggs). We will also have to take administrative measures (for example, rationed distribution).
In fact, three more weeks of the same raids - and suddenly it turns out that we have a serious problem. And just before the peak demand for fuel for planting.
https://t. me/anatoly_nesmiyan/17179